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Ahmad-Norma Permata
Muslim Insurgencies in Southeast Asia:
Intractability, the Security Dilemma,
and "Islamic Factor"
Abstraksi: Danasa ini, konflik-konflik sosial-politik di Asia Tenggara
kerap kali dipahami relatif terlepas darai faktor agama (Islam). Sikap ini
terutama berkembang di lingkungan elit politik pemerintahan beberapa
negara Asia Tenggara yang memiliki pengalaman konflik di wilayan mas-
ing-masing. Sikap ini didasarkan pada sejumlah alasan: pertama, faktor
agama akan menjerat negarapadaperdebatan isu-isu teologis dan ini cuk-
up sensitif;kedua, faktor agnma (Islam) akan menimbulkan sentimen glo-
bal masyarakat Muslim di dunia,
Artiklel ini memberikan gambaran berbeda dari kalangan elit politik
pemerintahan terhadap konflik yang terjadi di Asia Tenggara. Penulis
melihat bahws propaganda politis untuk menghindari simbol agama se-
b agai b agian dar i konflik memiliki alasan p enting. F akt or I slam tetap dom-
inan dalam masalah konflik Asia Tenggara, di samping faktor-faktor lain
yang bersifut politik dsn ekonomi, Islam misalnya memberikan peluang
cukup penting dalam konflik; Islam memperkuat ideologi politik keagam-
aan sebagai legitimasi pemberontaknn, di samping juga menjadi bahasa
yang efektif untuk mobilisasi masa sebagai bagian dari jihad. Dalam hal
terakhir ini, Islam telah menjadi komunitas global dengan konsep ummat,
sehingga terhubungkan secar a transnational.
KonJlik di Asia Tenggara berkaitan erat dengan konteks regional, sos-
ial-b u day a d an kon st eI asi p oI i t ik kene gar a an. D i P hil ip in a, konfl ik b ermu -
Iaberkaitan erat denganpersaingan misi agama (Islam dan Kristen) pasca
abad ke-13. Diskriminasi negara terhadap kelompok minoritas Muslim
menjadi lebih kentara ketika menyebut mereka sebagai Moro, artinya iden-
tik dengan kelompok Islam yang dulu menduduki Spanyol. Dari sanakth
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konflik terus berkecamuk. Agama dan identitas etnik bahkan menempati
bagian penting dari konflik itu. Pemberontakan oleh Muslim minoritas di
Mindanao, Philiphina Selatan, misalny a, lebih karena dip erlakukan tidak
adil dalam kehidupan ekonomi dan politik, walaupun ada unsur agama
yang ikut berperan.
Berbeda dengan Moro di Philipina, pemberontakan Aceh di Indonesia
hingga awal tahun 2004 lebih dipengaruhi faktor ekonomi dan politik.
Ralcyat Aceh secsra ekonomi tidak mendapatkan bagian hasil alam yang
seimbnng karena dominasi kEentingan politik lakarta, Permasalahan kon-
flik di Aceh hampir tidak terkait dengan agamn.
Serupa dengan Philipina,konflik diThsiland dan Myanmat menampil'
kan Islsm sebagai bagian yang tidak bisa dipisahkan dari masalah konflik.
Sebagai komunitas minoritas di Thailsnd selatan, kelompok Muslim merasa
diperlakukan tidak adil, setelah ter jadi pembagian wilayah teritorial pascn-
penjajahan Inggris. Semenntara di Myanmar, komunitas Arakan-mny'
oritas bergama Islam-menjadi kelompok minoritas yang diperlakukan se-
cara diskriminatif oleh pemerintah. Karena itu, konflik dan pemberonta-
kan dengan kekuatan militer sering muncul sebagai ekspresi ketidakpua-
saanmasyarakat.
Di samping persaingan agama dan politik, faktor global juga telah
memberikan warna tersendiri terhadap konflik dan pemberontakan do Asia
Tenggara. Ada empat hal dari peristiwa global yang mempengaruhi kon-
lik: pertama berrmula dari kolonialisme, kemudian perang dunia ke-II dan
ketiga karena masa perang dingin antara Amerika dan Uni Soaiet dan
t er akhir a dal ah kasus p er an g m el aw an t er or ism e.
HaI menarik daripengaruh global terhadap pemberontakan adalahfak-
tor terorisme. Ia tidak saja menjadi bagian dari pemberontakan di Asia
Tenggara tetapi juga telah meniadi propaganda utams Barat dalsm menS'
hadapi kelompok lslam garis keras. Bahkan bagi para analis politik, Asia
Tenggara telah menjadi areno perang bagi nl-Qaeda dan Amerika. Faktor
ngama telah menjadi simbol penting menumbuhkan kesadaran kelompok
Muslim tertentu dengan jargon jihad fi sabilillah (jihad di jalan Allah).
Dengan demikian, dari pembahasan artikel ini, pemberontakan-pem-
berontakan di Asia Tenggara memiliki berbagai dimensi, mulai dari per-
masalnhan politikkeamanan, kepentingan ekonomi sampai pada faktor Is-
lam. l..lntuk itu, konflik-konflik politik di Asia Tenggara dezasss ini-
ber ikut perkemb angan-p erkembangan p olitik secara utnLtm--4nensy ar at-
kan secara mutlak pentingnyn mempertimbangknn faktor agama. Terma'
suk dalam hal ini gejala reaiaalisme agama yang juga semakin kuat
berkembang belakangan ini di negara-negara di Asia Tenggara,
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n Southeast Asia Muslims account for more than 243 million
of the region's total population of around 582 million people.
Although geographically Muslim communities are concentrat-
ed in two countries 
- 
Indonesia and Malaysia 
- 
there are Mus-
lim communities in every Southeast Asian country. Given their
numbers in the region, the situation of the wider Muslim commu-
nity in Southeast Asia will inevitably influence the political dy-
namics of the region.
Until quite recently, unfortunately, few Studies on Islam in
Southeast Asia have been undertaken by either international Is-
lamic scholars or Southeast Asian scholars. Robert Hefner, the well-
known American anthropologist from Boston University, refers
to this situation as double marginalization. Muslims in Southeast
Asia were neglected both from international Islamic studies and
Southeast Asian studies. For the former, it was because historical-
ly Southeast Asian was among the latest to join the caravan of the
Islamic civilization. As a result scholars are predisposed to regard
Middle Eastern Islam as the more original and thus more worthy
of reference. As for the latter, social as well as political scientists
of Southeast Asian studies have for some time sensed that Islamic
culture was just an outer veneer of the real characteristics of South-
east Asian society (Hefner, 1997:2-3).
Recent developments, nevertheless, have brought Southeast
Asian Muslims into the spotlight of international media and schol-
arship. On the one hand, two successful elections in Indonesia,
during which Muslims played a pivotal role, have led observers
and analysts to refer to Indonesia as the finest example of a dem-
ocratic Muslim country (Carter, 2004). On the other hand, several
violent acts carried out by Muslim extremists have invited others
to warn that Indonesia, and Southeast Asia in general, is a poten-
tial hotbed for global terrorism (Abuza,2004).
In line with these recent developments, this article seeks like to
highlight the armed conflicts which have hit Muslim regions in
Southeast Asia - Moro in the Philippines, Aceh in Indonesia, Pa-
tani in Thailand, and Rohingya in Myanmar. The reason for this is
that it seems that this issue has not been given the international
coverage that it deserves in seeking a resolution to such conflicts.
Three main points will be elaborated on in the following dis-
cussion. Firstly,I would like to explain the chronology of the con-
flicts and at the same time reveal their intractable nature. Secondly,
I will analyze the cause of the conflict in terms of the security
245 Studin Islarnika, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006
246 Alunad-NormaPermata
dilemma: whether the conflicts were triggered by real or assumed
causes? Thirdly,I will address the specific "Islamic" factor of the
conflicts, which was denied by Southeast Asian governments as
being among the features of the conflicts, and propose a more
appropriate approach to it in order to reduce the intractability of
the conflicts.
Table 1
SOUTHEAST ASIAN MUSLIM PUPOLATIONS 2OO5
STATE
,
POPULATION MUSLIM % X MUSLIM SEA%
Indonesia 245,452,739 88.22 21,6,538,406 89.0s539998
Vietnam
84,402,966
0.8s 717,425 0.295054306
Philippines
89,468,677
5 4 47?. LaL 1,.839781901
Thailand 64,631,,595 5 3,231,,580 1,.329046575
Burma
47,382,633
1,895,305 0.779479152
Malaysia 24,385,858 60,4 14,729,058 6.057595945
Cambodia 13,887,427 3.5 485,850 0.199814727
Laos 6,368,481 I 63,685 0.0261,91,549
Singapore 4,492,150 16 718,744 0.295596682
East Timor 1,062,777 4 42,511 0.077483463
Brunei 379,444 67 )q4 ))7 0.1,04555724
SEA 581,908,747 243,1^50,226 100
Characteristics of Intractable Conflicts:
A Chronological Account
To put it simply, an intractable or protracted conflict is any
conflict which is very difficult to solve. Among other explanations,
Bercovitch (2003) listed some of the main characteristics of an in-
tractable conflict as follows:
L. In terms of actors, intractable conflicts inztolae states or other actors
ruith slong sense ofhistorical grierance, and strong desire to redress or
aaenge these.
This point is clearly applicable to the armed conflicts led by
Muslim groups in Southeast Asia. Although these conflicts are com-
monly seen as problems of post-colonial Southeast Asian states,
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the historical root of conflict dates back to the colonial or even
pre-colonial times. Typically, all Muslim groups involved in armed
conflicts were an independent religious-political community 
- 
in
the form of kingdoms, or vassalage 
- 
which were torn up by
western colonialism and finally ended up as parts of secular states
(Christie, 1996: 129-137).
In the Philippines, Muslim preachers arrived in the archipelago
as early as the 13th century. Because of the typical characteristic of
the spreading of Islam in Southeast Asian, which was without vi-
olence and without state coercion behind it, Muslims were able to
live in peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims for many centuries.
Only after the arrival of the Europeans did Muslims launch mas-
sive campaigns to proselytize locals (George, 1980: 19-20)'
Historians sometime speculate that if the Spanish has reached
the archipelago a few years later than they actually did, the Philip-
pines today would be a Muslim collntry like their neighbours In-
honesia and Malaysia(Ibid:21). The Spanish armada reached Cebu
in 1565 and were involved in bloody fights with the Muslims for
the next 350 years. They called Muslim people "Moros" in refer-
ence to Muslim Moors who had once occupied Spain for several
centuries. In 1BB9 the Philippines was handed over to the US, and
in 1906 a special Moro province was created.ln7940, the sultanate
system was abolished; as a result the Moro territories were brought
under the direct control of Manila. This situation continued after
Philippines independence in \946 (Islam, 2003,96-200).
In Indonesia, the history of the Aceh Muslim kingdom is even
older than the Philippines. The Kingdom of Perlak in the north tip
of Sumatra Island was established in the 9tr' century. The greater
kingdom, Samudra Pasai, was established in the 12h century and
had already become a great kingdom when the Venetian (Italian)
explorer Marco Polo visited Pasai in 1292.It was also the centre of
Islimic civilization, witnessing the emergence of great Muslim in-
tellectuals 
- 
theologians, mystics and poets 
- 
such as Hamzah
Fansuri, Syamsuddin Sumatrani, Abdurrauf Sinkel, amongst oth-
ers, whose works continue to be read across the Muslim world to
this very day.
Although European powers arrived in Malacca in the 16h cen-
tury, it was not until 1873 that there was conflict with European
colonizers in the form of the Dutch. The Aceh war officially ended
in 1903, but the Acehnese continued to fight guerilla wars up to
the Second World War when Indonesia was declared a secular
Studia lslamikn, Vol. 13, No. 2,2406
248 Ahmad-NormaPermata
state when it obtained its independence in 1945 (Christie, L996,
140-145).
Muslims have lived in Patani, now Southern Thailand, since the
15th century. Since the LSth century, however, Patani has been in
conflict and was eventually conquered by the Siamese (Thai) king-
dom. The Siamese established Patani as a protectorate and thus its
cultural and religious identity was protected and guaranteed. This
situation was sustained by the fact that state-borders were not so
clearly defined in Southeast Asia in which Patani Muslims still had
a close relationship with their fellow Muslims in neighbouring
Malay kingdoms.
The turning point was in 1909 when the Siamese kingdom made
a border adjustment in an agreement with the British colonial pow-
ers that ruled Malacca. The Siamese had to cede its Malay tribu-
taries of Kelantan, Kedah, Trengganu and Perlis, while it retained
the Patani and Satun provinces. Since that time, Malay Patani Mus-
lims have been trapped on the wrong side of the border, separat-
ed from the other Malay-Muslim communities. The Muslim com-
munity in Patani thus became a minority group in the predomi-
nantly Buddhist state of Thailand (Christie, 1996:173-177).
The Arakan people of Northwest Myanmar have had to share
a similar experience as their brethren in Patani. Muslims from Ben-
gal who had occupied Arakan Hill since the 10ft century founded
the Mrauk-U sultanate in the L5th century. In the 19h century Brit-
ish colonial powers separated the administration of Burma from
India and included the Arakan area into the former. When the
Islamic state of Pakistan was declare d in 1946, Muslims in Arakan
pushed for Arakan to be included as part of Pakistan, but to no
avail (Christie, 1996: 1.67-168).
2. In terms of duration, intractable conflicts take place oaer a long period
of time.
Current armed conflicts in Southeast Asia have a long history.
The current armed movements in Moro, the Philippines, were start-
ed in 1968 when Muslims formed the Mindanao Independence
Movement (MIM) in response to the repressive policies of the
Marcos administration. The government responded by co-opting
elite Moro into high level government administration, which gen-
erated discontent among the younger generation who went on to
Studia lslamika, Vol. 13, No. 2,2006
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form the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur
Misuari.
MNLF was in constant conflict with the Philippines authority
until1976 when - mediated by the Organization of Islamic Confer-
ence (OIC) - the two parties signed the Tripoli agreement, in which
the Marcos administration promised an independent area of Mus-
lim Mindanao which included 13 provinces and nine cities in re-
turn for the MNLF dropping its demands for complete indepen-
dence.
This agreement generated further disappointment among the
younger and educated generation, who then formed the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), led by Hasyim Salamat, to con-
tinue pursuing Moro as independent region. Another break up
from MNLF occurred in the early 1980s, when a faction under
Abdul Razak Janjalani split and formed the infamous Abu Sayyaf
group (Islam, 2003: 200-207).
In Aceh Indonesia, the armed movement against the Indone-
sian government was started in 1953 when the Acehnese people
- 
under the leadership of Mohammad Daud Beureueh 
- 
joined
the Darul Islam rebellion against the Indonesian Central Covern-
ment which sought declaration of independent Islamic states in
four provinces (Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi and South Kali-
mantan).
The Darul Islam movement in Aceh ceased to exist when Daud
Beureueh made an agreement with the local Sovernment which
conceded special province status to Aceh under the Indonesian
Republic. But the armed movement was started again in 1976 un-
der the banner of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM or the Aceh In-
dependence Movement) led by Hassan di Tiro, who has lived in
Sweden since 1979 (Christie, 1996:156-158)' In 2004 GAM signed a
conclusive agreement with the Indonesian government following
the tsunami disaster which claimed more than L30,000 Acehnese
lives, and there has since been a Peace agreement between GAM
and the central government bringing the conflict to an end.
In Thailand, the Patani armed resistance against the central
government was started in 1945 when Muslim leaders under the
organization of GAMPAR (which stand for Gabungan Melayu Pa-
tani Raya or the Malay League of Greater Patani) wrote a petition,
lead by Mahmud Mahyidin and Haji Sulong, to the British colonial
ruler in Malaya to ask for help to be freed from Thai occupation,
with no success. Despite a number of so-called 'high points' in the
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late 1960s, mid-1970s and between 1.979-1981, Muslim Patani has
never really posed a serious threat to Bangkok (Christie, 1996:
186-189).
Recently, in the post-9/11. era, heated confrontations in South-
ern Thailand between Muslim Patani groups and the Thai military
authorities have escalated. A number of terror attacks against the
military as well as civil targets have raised suspicions that al-Qae-
da is operating in the region. Heavy handed responses from the
Thai government have attracted criticism, especially the October
2004 Tak Bhai tragedy when 78 Patani Muslims were suffocated to
death after being arrested and put in trucks by the Thai military.
Meanwhile armed resistance from Arakan Muslims started in
1948 when Muslims gained control militarily in Northern Arakan
in a jihad movement while the central government was preoccu-
pied with national consolidation. In 1954 the central government
was able to put an end to this rebellion. Since, the political move-
ment organrzedby Arakanese Muslims could better be described
as dissidence rather than rebellion. Nonetheless, the military has
tended to perceive all Muslims as potential threats and in its re-
port on Myanmar, Amnesty International has alleged that the mil-
itary regime is guilty of ethnic cleansing of the Muslim minority
(Amnesty International, 2004).
3. In terms of issues, intractable conflicts inuolae intangible issues such ss
identity , soaereignty , ualues and beliefs.
Armed conflicts among Muslims in Southeast Asia were not
only caused by economic or political interests. These conflicts were
fiercely fought because these Muslim communities felt their reli-
gious and ethnic identities were threatened.
In the Philippines, not only did the central government exploit
economically the wealth of the southern region (Ceorge, 1980: L07-
128), but they promoted the mass migration of Catholics from the
densely populated north region, which eventually made Muslims
a minority in Mindanao (Islam, 20A3: 201). This of course led to
Muslims in Moro to feel that the Catholic state was seeking to
exterminate their religious and ethnic identity. As a result, at the
fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign ministers (ICFM), the Philip-
pines Government was asked to do more to protect Muslim peo-
ple's rights in the country (Islam, 2003:204).
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In Indonesia, the Acehnese were among the fiercest to fight
against Dutch colonialism and supported Indonesian independence.
Even the first civil airplane owned by the Indonesian Government
was bought though Acehnese fundraising. Resentment mounted
among the Acehnese people because 
- 
although granted special
status 
- 
Aceh was always under the direct control of Jakarta and
never able to implement Islamic policies. The hatred towards Jakar-
ta was even higher when under the New Order administration
(1,965-1998) Aceh political and military administration was domi-
nated by Javanese administrators 
- 
many of whom were widely
perceived as not being devout Muslims. It was, therefore, com-
mon among the Acehnese to call Indonesia "Javanese-Indonesia",
which meant not only that Indonesia was in fact dominated by the
Javanese, but also implied that the Acehnese did not see them-
selves as part of Indonesia.
In Southern Thailand, the situation for Patani Muslims was not
so different. In Thailand, Malay Muslims were often referred to
as khaek or 'foreigners', which implies that Malay Muslims in Pa-
tani were not one and the same as the Thai people (Christie, 1996:
192). The feelings of being deliberately oPpressed by the Bud-
dhist Thai government was supported by the fact that the three
dominant Mushm provinces economically lagged behind the oth-
er regions.
In Myanmar, the situation of Muslims is perhaps the worst of
all cases. According to Myanmar Law 1982, the Rohingya (which
are Muslim) are not among the recognized ethnic grouPs in Myan-
mar, and therefore the Rohingya people are ineligible for full cit-
izenship. Their mobility is restricted. Rohingya people need to get
permission from local authorities to be able to travel even to near-
by villages. They have to pay $50-100 to get permission to marry,
which is too high an amount for most people to be able to Pay,
and can have no more than two children. They are also subjected
to compulsory sentry duties at nights and duties during the days
for the government, especially to build or maintain public infra-
structure. And last but not least, Rohingya religious expressions
and activities are also tightly restricted. (Amnesty International,
2004; Refugees International, 2006).
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4. ln terms of geopolitics, intractable conflicts usually take place where
buffer states exist between major power blocks or ciailizations.
The characteristics of the buffer region could be applied to
Southeast Asian. The region has in fact been shaped by the influ-
ence of other major civilizations. The first major influence came
from the Indian civilization. Hindu and Buddhist cultures influ-
enced social, economic and political history in the region since the
early centuries of the Christian calendar. The next major influence
came from the Islamic civilization which swept the region after
the 8th century, and dominated coastal areas. Thirdly, since the
15h century, European civilization and religions started to influ-
ence the region. Finally, although in a more limited scope, Chinese
civilization has also exercised constant influence on Southeast Asian
societies.
The history of Southeast Asia, in short, was heavily under the
effect of the dynamics of global politics. With regard to the con-
flict in Muslim areas of Southeast Asia, the influence of global pol-
itics and the balance of power could not be neglected. At least
four global events could be put forward: Colonialism, World War
II, the Cold War and the War on Terror.
The arrival of European powers in Southeast Asia had a para-
mount impact on Muslim politics in Southeast Asia. Before the ar-
rival of Europeans, Islamic communities generally dominated the
coastal areas. Major Islamic kingdoms were coastal kingdoms, from
Mrauk-U in the Bengal Gulf, to Patani and Malacca in Malay Pen-
insula, to Aceh in Sumatra Island, eastward to the Philippines Ar-
chipelago as well as southward to the Indonesian Archipelago.
All Muslim palaces were located near the sea.
When the Portuguese took control of Malacca, a major Muslim
port, the reactions of Muslim kingdoms in the region were im-
mense. Even the Demak Sultanate on the north-coast of Central
Java Indonesia sent his army to help Malacca against the Europe-
ans. The conquering of formerly Muslim territories at the hands
of the Europeans led to deep resentment among Muslims, leading
to two important developments in Southeast Asian Islam. Firstly,
the European military and technological might urged Muslim rul-
ers to spread Islam deeper inland beyond coastal areas, in order
to have more reserve forces and resources. SecondlA, the introduc-
tion of new politics of Pan-Islamism brought by returned pilgrims
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from Mecca/ gave colonialism a new meaning presenting it as a
global war between the Islamic world and the Western world.
World War II marked another important phase for Muslims in
Southeast Asia. The end of colonialism and the rise of nationalist
movements, the formation of independent nation-states, shaped
Southeast Asian politics in new and permanent ways. Newly in-
dependent states trapped formerly independent Muslim commu-
nities, and locked them into their secular states. The inhabitants
of Muslim kingdoms in Sulu in Jolo have now become minority
communities in the Republic of the Philippines. Aceh became a
province of secular Indonesia. Muslims in Patani became part of
the predominantly Buddhist Thai kingdom. And Rohingya Mus-
lims were forced to become part of Myanmar,
Lastly, the current American-led war on terror once again drags
Southeast Asian Muslims into the stream of global politics. Many
analysts agree that Southeast Asia has become a new arena of proxy
war between America and al-Qaeda. The story began at the Cold
War Era, when many Southeast Asian Muslims involved in a jihad
against Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 
- 
which was fully backed
up by the US technically and militarily. Subsequently, alumnus of
the Afghan war maintained their networks not only with their
Southeast Asian fellows, but also with jihndis across the world 
-from Sudan, to Chechnya, to Indonesia. When many Arab states
seemed dictated by the US, particularly after the Saudi ruler invit-
ed the US military to set up base on Saudi soil and the holy land
for all Muslims, resentment was triggered among jihadis who were
ready for a new war. Post 9/11 international politics and the dis-
course of the global war on terror have added a new dimension
to the conflicts in Muslim parts of Southeast Asia.
Real or Assumed Revolts:
The Intra-State Security Dilemma
At this stage it seems pertinent to have a closer look at the
armed conflict among Muslims in Southeast Asia in terms of the
security dilemma: whether the armed resistances of Muslims in
Southeast Asia against their respective governments were caused
by real or illusory threats. Terminologically, the term "security
dilemma" originated in studies of international politics; it refers
to a situation when conflict or military tensions occurred between
two or more states where none of those involved desired such an
outcome. The tension and conflict were caused bv the nature of
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inter-state relations, where states live in a self-help anarchy situa-
tion of international politics, trapped in arms-races and saw their
own conduct as benign self defence while perceiving the actions
of their foes as threatening. In other words, the security dilemma
is a situation where conflicts result between two powers, both of
which are desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort (Col-
lins, 2000: 4).
Although it was initially used to describe inter-state politics,
scholars apply the concept of security dilemma also for intra-state
conflicts. Intra-state conflicts might be caused by security dilem-
ma when a party's non-expansionist or self-defensive actions (state
or intra-state group) are perceived by others as threatening their
security. The essence of the security dilemma is a tragedy that,
unknown to either side, while appearing real, is actually illusion-
ary. This means need to bear in mind 
- 
that when the
conflict was caused by deliberate action by any party to threaten
or to harm others then this is not a security dilemma situation.
In the Philippines' case, the MNLF was formed as a reaction to
the government's co-optation of Moro elites, by giving them high
positions in the government. This co-optation, in turn, was intended
to contain mounting resentments among Moros after the "Jabadi-
lah Massacre," when the Philippines army trained a group of Mus-
lims to be deployed in borderline-conflict with Malaysia but-for
unknown reasons-these trainees were murdered.
Seen from the latter context, the Moro armed resistance against
the Philippines Government was not a product of a security di-
lemma, because the government did indeed harm the Moro com-
munity. Seen from a different angle, however, the antagonism was
possibly caused by a security dilemma, because the MNLF resent-
ment was two-fold, i.e. toward the co-opting government as well
as toward the co-opted elites. The Moro elites' acceptance of the
government's offer was multi-interpretable. On the one hand, they
could have just been being opportunistic, or on the other hand it
could also have been part of a moderation policy in the Moro strug-
gle. History repeated itself when MNLF signed an agreement with
Manila, and triggered the formation of the more militant MILF
and Abu Sayyaf groups.
In Indonesia, in the Independent Aceh movement (GAM) re-
volt against the Indonesian Government, the security dilemma sit-
uation is more apparent. When the revolt was declared in 1976,
the main reason was Takarta's svstematic exploitation of Aceh's
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huge supplies of natural resources, and undermining Acehnese
Islamic identity. Meanwhile from the government point of view,
strict and centralistic political and military policies were intended
to ascertain and maintain the authority of the central government
and to prevent any subversive movement, due to the government
and the military trauma of the Muslim insurgency. Similarly strict
policies were also applied, at the time, to other regions which have
a historical record of armed revolt against the central government.
This was a perfect example of an intra-state security dilemma, when
the Indonesian government wanted to make sure that their sover-
eignty and authority were in place by applying strict policies in
provinces which had a historical record of armed resistance; the
policy was perceived from the provinces' point of view as unjusti-
fied systematic exploitation and destruction of their resources and
identity.
Furthermore, the Indonesian government's response to the re-
volt made a bad situation worse. To uproot the CAM movement
- 
which was actually a semi-military militia group whose mem-
bers lived among the people 
- 
the Indonesian military took heavy
handed actions especially in 1980s when it applied martial law and
treated the whole Aceh province as a region of military operation.
This military measure only created more resentment among the
Acehnese people, with GAM accusing Jakarta of unjustifiably col-
onizing Aceh. Rather than reducing the resistance, the military
operation indeed strengthened GAM's position and popularity
among the Acehnese.
In Southern Thailand, where the armed conflict is not as strong
as that of the Philippines and Indonesian cases, the security dilem-
ma also shadowed the conflict, especially with regard to the more
recent phase of the conflict. After lying dormant for quite some
time, armed conflict in Southern Thailand broke out again follow-
ing the declaration of the war on terror by the US. The Tek Bhai
incident in 2004, for instance, sparked another intra-state security
dilemma. The Thai government, a good ally of the US in Southeast
Asia, conducted security operations to track and crack-down on
existing al-Qaeda networks or operatives in the country, focusing
on predominantly Muslim provinces. This led to a three-partite
conflict. On the one hand, there was a purposive security opera-
tion against al-Qaeda networks, and on the other hand there was
also a side effect of escalation of anger among Patani Muslims in
general, because of the way the Thai military carried out its oper-
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ations. The indiscriminate nature of the security oPeration, in turn,
was caused by its very objective, namely to unearth a shadowy
and underground organization whose members were living among
the wider Muslim community.
Lastly in Myanmar, the conflict between Rohingya Muslims and
the Myanmar Government has seemingly involved no security
dilemma. In fact, after a struggle for independence failed in the
Arakan region, Rohingya Muslims have only pursued greater au-
tonomy for their community. However the Myanmar military jun-
ta deliberately persecutes Rohingya people along with other mi-
nority groups. Because ethnically they are of Bengali stock, many
Rohingya people have tried to cross the border as refugees to neigh-
bouring Bangladesh.
Islam: the Denied Factor
In discussing armed conflict in Muslim dominated regions of
Southeast Asia, it is interesting to note how the governments have
tended to deny "Islam" as being a major factor in the conflicts. In
the Philippines, in an effort to build dialogue between conflicting
parties, the government referred to Muslim Moro only as a cultur-
al group, not religious (George, 1"980: LB5-186). In Indonesia dur-
ing the New Order Regime the Indonesian government called the
Free Aceh Movement a Security Disturbance Movement (Gerakan
Pengacau Keamanan), which implies that the movement was no
more than a band of criminals or gangsters and not a bit rePre-
sented Muslim Aceh. In Thailand, the authorities have tended to
see conflicts with the Patani Muslims as merely a security problem
that could be solved with military might (International Crisis
Groups, 2005). Even in Myanmar, in response to a report of hu-
man rights abuses, the government stated that it was not in con-
flict with any religious minority groups (Human Rights Watch,
L997).
While at first glance, the approach of rejecting the religious fac-
tor seems smart, namely because it would not trigger negative
sentiments from the whole Muslim community, on closer observa-
tion, however, this strategy was ill-advised. Firstly, by setting aside
the Islamic factor, the governments missed one of the very sourc-
es of energy, motivation, and inspiration for the insurgencies. Is-
lam has played, at least, three simultaneous roles in these con-
flicts. Firstly,Islarn gave a sense of historical, cultural as well as
political identity. For these Muslim groups Islam is not only a set
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of beliefs and rituals, but also a historical, socio-cultural and polit-
ical framework by which they could refer to themselves as well as
to differentiate themselves from other people. More importantly,
Islam gave these people moral and spiritual legitimacy of what
they are and what they have done. In short, Islam is the political
ideology of these insurgencies.
Secondly,Islam also provided an effective means for mass mo-
bilization. Indeed, although they share the sufferings and discon-
tent of the whole ethnic community, the insurgence groups were
always initiated by a small number of people tried to pursue a
violent way to end the political oppression and discrimination the
respective communities had to endure. Usually, they would justi-
fy their conduct using religious symbols such as lihad. By making
their struggle out to be a jihad or religious war, these insurgence
groups tried to encapsulate their struggle not primarily as politi-
cal movements but rather as moral and spiritual ones against not
only a political power and institutions (i.e. the states), but rather
against the enemy of God. The abstraction of political interests
using religious language was effective in mobilizing wider sup-
port from the community. This was because religious language
was more familiar for the ordinary people in the Muslim commu-
nities. Explaining the insurgencies in terms of jihad against secular
and anti-Muslim states was simpler and easier for the people to
understand than describing them in political, judicial or economic
terms. Moreover, in expressing their struggle in religious terms,
insurgence groups were able to attach a higher moral value to
their causes and to what they were doing. In political and military
terms, a struggle could have two possible ends: success or fail.
Therefore, there are many people who would not support the in-
surgencies because they did not want to risk becoming losers. But
in terms of jihad the two possible ends are a win-win situation:
when you win you would be the victors, when you die you would
ascend straight away to eternal paradise as a martyr.
Thirdly,Islam provided for the insurgences an effective means
to internationalize their cases. In Islam there is a concept of supra-
state universal Muslim brotherhood or ummah, in which Muslims
from across the globe constitute a single religious community
bounded by common faith and religious identity. Furthermore, it
was said that the Muslim community should help each other; the
Muslim community is like a single human body, when any single
part of the body is hurt the whole body feels the pain. politically,
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these insurgence groups were able to appeal for help from inter-
national Muslim organizations or communities. Intervention from
the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), for example, was
able to put pressure on the Philippines Government to sign an
agreement with the MNLF. The conflict in Patani has also become
a serious concern for the OIC, so much so that the Thai Govern-
ment has sent their delegates to OIC headquarters in Jeddah (Sau-
di Arabia) to explain the Thai government's programs in the South-
ern provinces as well as to build a better relationship with the
OIC and its members. Continuous contact with other Muslim in-
surgence groups throughout the world provides Muslim insur-
gents in Southeast Asia with moral and psychological support and
motivation to continue their struggle. Finally, borderless nature
of Islam and the strong emphasis on brotherhood has enabled in-
surgent groups to obtain financial support from throughout the
Muslim world, especially from riches countries in the Middle East.
Given the three above-mentioned considerations, it seems un-
wise for the governments to negate the Islam factor from efforts
to solve the conflicts. This decision to reject Islam as a factor is a
result of the governments' ignorance of Islam and Muslims. Typi-
cally, they have regarded Islam as a single entity, and tended to
see Muslims as a unitary group. These governments were afraid,
therefore, that by addressing the insurgencies as "Islamic" they
would provoke a combined response from the entire global Mus-
lim community.
This was only partially correct as Muslims and Islam are never
monolithic or unitary entities; although founded upon common
basic principles, in fact there are many schools and sects in Islam,
resulting from differences in interpretation of the teachings of the
religion. Consequently, there are always pluralities among Mus-
lim communities. The armed struggle waged by insurgent groups
was not necessarily representative of the desires of the whole glo-
bal Muslim community. Many 
- 
if not the majority 
- 
of the Mus-
lims do not support resorting to violence in order to solve prob-
lems. Furthermore, theoretically, relations between the religion
and social dynamics are always twofold: on the one hand, reli-
gious doctrine might be prescriptiue, rn the sense that it dictates
what the believers could or could not and should or should not
do; on the other hand religious doctrine might also be legitimatiue,
in the sense that it is used by the believers to legitimize what they
have done (Permata, 2006).
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As far as the insurgencies are concerned, the way that Islamic
doctrines were utilized by the insurgents was to legitimize their
causes. It does not mean, however, that this was illegitimate or
unjustified acts. This is a very normal, hence legitimate, way of
being religious: to legitimize what people are doing with their
moral and spiritual values. Yet it does tell us that the religious
interpretations of the insurgent groups 
- 
to solve the communal
or religious problem through armed resistance not neces-
sarily representative of the whole Muslim community. What the
Southeast Asian government can do is to identify the main charac-
teristic of the religious interpretations of insurgent groups which
are likely jihadist or violent in character. The next step is to find
another interpretation, and finally, they may promote moderate
ways of interpreting and practising Islam.
Conclusion:
Addressing Muslim Insurgences
Muslim Insurgencies in Southeast Asia have their own specific
characteristics. These revolts were a result of accumulative resent-
ment towards governments and their policies with regard to their
ethnic or communal groups. Because these discriminative policies
influenced almost every single aspect of the people's communal
life, they caused problems not purely related to interests only, but
also pertaining to the groups' identities. When the conflicts start-
ed to involve intangible issues, such as values and identities, they
became intractable conflicts. At this point, beyond the complexi-
ties of the protracted conflicts, the governments need to pay seri-
ous attention to the initial cause of the conflicts, namely the dis-
criminative policies. The governments should improve the dismal
conditions often faced by the Muslim communities as the starting
point for solving the conflicts.
Muslim insurgencies, however, also have a specific "Islamic"
nature. In this respect, religion has provided three simultaneous
facilities to the insurgencies. It serves as religiotts-political ideolo-
gy by which the conflicts are legitimized; it also provides effective
language for mass-mobilization by identifying the conflicts not as
political or economic but religious struggles or jihad; and lastly
Islam enables the insurgents to internationalize their causes, to
get political, moral and material support from international Mus-
lim communities and organizations. For this point, Southeast Asian
governments should identify violent religious interpretations of
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the insurgence grouPs, find more moderate and non-violent in-
terpretations among Muslim communities, and promote these
moderate groups as being representative of Muslim communities.
This is, of course, not as simple as we have presented it in this
article, for sometimes Muslims are left with a complicated choice,
between radical but clean groups and moderate but corrupt ones
- 
as was the case in Palestine.
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